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I. INTRODUCTION
In a ruling on March 13, 2004, Justice Geoffrey Robertson of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone was disqualified from hearing any cases involving the Revolutionary
United Front.1 The decision was based on opinions expressed by Robertson in his 2002
book, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice.2 Although the Office
of the Prosecutor supported the disqualification of Justice Robertson under these
circumstances, it is now concerned that the decision will be over-generalized to apply to
other members of the Special Court’s bench for their academic writings published before
their appointment to the Special Court.
The judiciary aspires to preserve both the reality and the appearance of
neutrality.3 However, judges are academic members of the legal community, and should
therefore be expected to write scholarly articles and treatises on issues within their
expertise. Except in the most extreme cases, a judge’s independence and impartiality
should not be deemed as compromised by any such academic writings when they are
made before the judge is appointed to his or her position on the court. As an active
member of the legal field, a judge cannot reasonably be expected to be void of any
cognizance of the issues which may come before his or her bench, especially in the
confined universe of the international judiciary. Thus, past scholarly writings should

1

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Decision on Defense Motion Seeking the Disqualification of Justice
Robertson from the Appeals Chamber, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR15 (March 13, 2004) (“Prosecutor v.
Issa Hassan Sesay”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 27].

2

Id.

3

Kiley Marie Corcoran, Mandamus and Recusal: Promoting Public Confidence in the Judicial Process, 9
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 13 (2004) (“Mandamus and Recusal”). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 45].
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generally not be seen as having any effect on the detached, neutral and impartial
character that the judge has sworn to uphold.
Part II of this memorandum provides the factual background concerning the
disqualification of Justice Geoffrey Robertson from the Appeals Chamber of the Special
Court. Part III of this memorandum details the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Anto
Furundzija, relied upon by the Appeals Chamber in disqualifying Justice Robertson. The
section goes on to suggest that the test from the ICTY case was misapplied by the
Appeals Chamber in disqualifying Justice Robertson, with potential negative
consequences for future cases. Part IV of this memorandum details the standards for
judicial conduct in the United States, as well as surveys similar standards in several
nations across the globe. Part V of this memorandum then highlights international
standards of judicial impartiality in tribunal statutes, various rules of procedure and
proposed basic principles and minimum standards. Finally, Part VI of this memorandum
seeks to formulate a standard for international judicial conduct based on the foregoing to
come to the conclusion that the academic writings of a judge, especially those written
outside the capacity as judge, are not an indicator of partiality or bias while on the court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the issue of judicial impartiality, it is first necessary to discuss
the series of events that brought this issue to the floor of the Appeals Chamber of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Many of the prosecutions that make up the caseload of
the Special Court are those involving the Revolutionary United Front, or RUF. The RUF,
with its brutal and unorthodox guerilla tactics, emerged in the second half of the 1980s,

2

and was a prominent military presence during Sierra Leone’s civil war.4 A humanitarian
crisis quickly resulted from the RUF’s tactics, which involved brutal attacks on unarmed
civilians and children.5 The RUF has also been known to target journalists, lawyers and
ethnic groups specifically, as well as use women and children as human shields.6
RUF head Foday Sankoh was indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity
and violations of international humanitarian law by the Special Court, along with several
other RUF leaders, in March 2003.7 The prior year, prominent human rights advocate
and barrister Geoffrey Robertson published a book entitled, Crimes Against Humanity:
The Struggle for Global Justice.8 In the book, Robertson made several references to
Sankoh, referring to him as a despicable psychopath given to mutilating citizens.9 The
book also details the killings, rapes, mutilations and pillages carried out by the RUF
during the civil war, all the while renouncing Sankoh and other RUF sympathizers.10
Given this publicized view by Robertson of the atrocities committed by the RUF, it is
easy to see why defense teams for RUF members would call into question Robertson’s

4

Revolutionary United Front, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 53].

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Indictments at the Special Court, 10 March 2003, available at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/WhatHappening/PressReleaseOTP.htm. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook II at Tab 51].
8

The Head Heeb: Recusal, available at http://headheeb.blogmosis.com/archives/023374.html.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 55].
9

GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (The New
Press, 2002) at 467. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 37].
10

Id.

3

impartiality when he subsequently became President Judge of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.
One such challenge was made by the defense team for Issa Hassan Sesay, another
RUF member indicted along with Sankoh in March 2003.11 A motion was filed on
February 27, 2004 seeking the disqualification of Justice Robertson from the Appeals
Chamber on the grounds that the Judge “has expressed the clearest bias against both the
Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary United Front and
thereby has displayed lack of impartiality to the accused indicted as members of these
groups and their respective defenses.”12 The Prosecution conceded due to a concern that
the integrity and credibility of the Court would be called into question by the public if
Justice Robertson remained on the bench of the Appeals Chamber in such cases.13 After
Justice Robertson refused to withdraw, the Special Court on March 13, 2004, pursuant to
Rule 15 of the Court, ruled to disqualify Justice Robertson from adjudicating on those
motions involving alleged members of the RUF for which decisions are pending, in the
Appeals Chamber, and cases involving the RUF if and when they come before the
Appeals Chamber.14
The importance of this decision by the Appeals Chamber lies in the issue
concerning the impartiality of the judiciary that arises from it. More precisely, it
becomes prudential to inquire whether a judge can remain an impartial arbiter of justice

11

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, supra at note 1, at para. 1. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
II at Tab 27].
12

Id., citing Motion by Defense, at para. 2.

13

Id. at para. 8.

14

Id. at para. 18.
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when he has previously expressed a written opinion on a named defendant prior to
becoming a judge on the bench for that defendant’s trial. Little exists regarding how a
judge chooses to express his opinion before he has taken the oath to become a judge,
especially in the limited and confined universe of international law. However, rules and
customs regarding a judge’s behavior and conduct while presiding, as well various
domestic provisions for recusal and disqualification of judges, can provide some insight
into differentiating between those expressions of opinion or bias that clearly encroach on
a judge’s impartiality, and those that do not.
III. THE ICTY DECISION CITED BY THE APPEALS CHAMBER
A. The Ruling in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija
In making its ruling on the disqualification of Justice Robertson, the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court relied heavily upon the July 2000 decision by the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor
v. Anto Furundzija. The case involved a challenge by the appellant similar to the one
asserted by Sesay. Specifically, one of the grounds submitted for appeal was that
presiding Judge Mumba should have been disqualified from trying the case.15 Judge
Mumba had been the Zambian representative to the United Nations Commission on the
Status of Women (UNCSW) prior to her election to the International Tribunal, and the
two duties never coincided or were carried out simultaneously.16 During Judge Mumba’s
membership with the UNCSW, the organization drafted the “Platform for Action,” a
15

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, A. Ch., 21 July 2000 (“Prosecutor v. Furundzija”) at para. 25.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 26].

16

Press Release (2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2003/p803-e.htm. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook II at Tab 52].
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document which identified twelve major problem areas concerning women’s rights, three
of which were relevant to issues in the former Yugoslavia.17 Also during Judge Mumba’s
membership in the UNCSW, the organization passed several resolutions condemning the
systematic mass rape that was taking place in Yugoslavia at the time, and urged the
International Tribunal to prosecute those responsible. In light of these facts, the appellant
alleged a personal interest on the part of Judge Mumba in the ongoing agenda of the
UNCSW, which had a detrimental effect on the impartiality of his trial.18
The test for judicial disqualification proposed by the appellant was whether “a
reasonable member of the public, knowing all of the facts, would come to the conclusion
that Judge Mumba has or had any association, which might affect her impartiality.”19
The appellant did not allege that Judge Mumba was actually biased, rather only that a
reasonable person could apprehend bias. This emphasizes the importance of the idea that
a tribunal must have the appearance of impartiality.20
Conversely, the prosecution asserted that the appellant submitted no evidence of
actual bias or partiality, and proposed that the standard for a finding of bias should be
high and that judges should not be disqualified purely on the basis of their personal
beliefs or legal expertise.21

17

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra at note 15, at para.167. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 26].

18

Id., at para. 169.

19

Id. (emphasis in original).

20

See, e.g., Webb v. The Queen, 181 C.L.R. 41 (1994) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at
Tab 34]; see also President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. South African Rugby Football
Union and Others, Judgment on Recusal Application (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
II at Tab 25].
21

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra at note 15, at para. 171. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 26].

6

In devising the proper test and coming to a decision, the Appeals Chamber first
noted the statutory requirement of impartiality found in the Statute of the International
Tribunal. Article 13 states that all judges shall be persons of high moral character,
impartiality and integrity.22 Additionally, Article 21 states generally the rights of an
accused to a fair and impartial trial.23 The majority considered that these two articles
reflected the fundamental human right to be tried before and independent and impartial
tribunal.24 In interpreting these basic statutory requirements, the Appeals Chamber first
surveyed the interpretations of various national legal systems on the subject of
impartiality, which this memorandum does in great detail below.
After consulting the statutory requirement, as well as national jurisprudence, the
Appeals Chamber devised a two-prong test for judicial disqualification. First, a judge is
not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists.25 Second, there is an unacceptable
appearance of bias if a judge is a party to the case, or has financial or proprietary interest
in the outcome of the case, or if the judge’s decision will lead to the promotion of a cause
in which he or she is involved, together with one of the parties, or the circumstances
would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed to reasonably apprehend bias.26

22

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended 19 May 2003 by
Resolution 1481) at art. 13. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at Tab 6].

23

Id., at art. 21.

24

Greg Lombardi and Michael Scharf, Commentary to Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, in ANDRE
KLIP & GORAN SLUITER eds., ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, VOL. 5
(Intersentia, 2003) (“ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS”) at 358. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 35].
25

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra at note 15, at para. 189. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 26].
26

Id. (It should be noted that the “reasonable observer” referred to in the second prong of the test is to be
imparted with knowledge of all of the surrounding circumstances, including a knowledge of the traditions
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The Appeals Chamber then applied the test to the case at hand. Emphasizing that
Judge Mumba’s membership in the UNCSW was not contemporaneous with the period of
her tenure as judge, reaffirming the presumption of impartiality that attaches to a judge,
and recognizing that judges naturally have personal convictions from which they can
detach themselves in their duties as judge, the Appeals Chamber held that the appellant’s
argument had no basis.27
B. The Test from Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija was Misapplied by the Appeals
Chamber for the Special Court in Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay.
The Appeals Chamber for the Special Court for Sierra Leone misapplied the test
for impartiality from Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija in two fundamental ways. First, it
seems to have ignored the three major justifications for the International Tribunal’s ruling
that Judge Mumba should not have been disqualified. Namely, the ruling does not
adequately address the fact that Justice Robertson expressed his opinions before and not
after he took the judicial oath, the presumption of judicial impartiality, or the ability of
judges to detach themselves from personal opinion in carrying out their duties. Second,
the Appeals Chamber, in its rationale, incorrectly characterized the “reasonable man” or
knowledgeable observer referred to in the Furundzija test. Each of these misapplications
shall be analyzed in turn.
Turning first to the SCSL Appeals Chamber’s failure to recognize the important
reasons for the Furundzija decision, it is foremost noteworthy that Justice Robertson
published Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice in 2002, well

of integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, as well as the fact that judges swear to uphold the duty of
impartiality).
27

Id., at paras. 194-199.

8

before being sworn in on the Special Court.28 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Furundzija
went to great lengths to emphasize the fact that Judge Mumba’s membership in the
UNCSW occurred before she was elected to the International Tribunal.29 The Appeals
Chamber of the Special Court only mentions that the book was published in 2002, and
makes no mention of the fact that this occurred before Justice Robertson held a position
on the court. This is a crucial omission, for it seems to discount or devalue the fact that a
judicial oath is taken between the time when a judge may have expressed his or her
written opinion, and the time when he or she presides on a court. In Justice Robertson’s
case, his well-informed, professional opinion was written before he was elected to the
Special Court. The duty of impartiality he swore to uphold trumps any academic
editorial he may have penned prior to the taking of the oath.
Additionally, the ruling by the SCSL Appeals Chamber disqualifying Justice
Robertson does not lend sufficient deference to the presumption of judicial impartiality
reaffirmed in the Furundzija ruling. In Furundzija, the Appeals Chamber recognized that
a presumption of impartiality and neutrality is prevalent in their own jurisprudence.30
The ruling also noted that this presumption is recognized in other national jurisdictions as
well.31 Conversely, the ruling by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court in Sesay

28

The Appeals Chamber, Website of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.scsl.org/chambers.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 54].

29

See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra at note 15, at para. 194 (citing and distinguishing Lord
Hoffman’s contemporaneous involvement with Amnesty International during his involvement with the
Pinochet case). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 26].
30

Id., at para. 196 (citing Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic et al. (1998)).

31

See President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. South African Rugby Football Union and
Others, Judgment on Recusal Application, supra at note 20 (“The reasonableness of the apprehension [of
bias] must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer justice without
fear or favor; and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience”).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 25].

9

only briefly posits the general principle that judges must be above suspicion of bias.32
Nowhere does the ruling state the opposite conclusion, specifically that judges are to be
presumed impartial until proof is made otherwise. Again, this omission has the effect of
undermining the oath taken by judges, as well as the overall integrity of the office of the
judiciary.
On a related point, the SCSL Appeals Chamber also did not adequately take into
account a judge’s professional ability and duty to disabuse his or her mind of any
personal beliefs or predispositions. The ruling in Furundzija recognized this ability by
conceding that judges will have personal convictions, and that absolute neutrality on the
part of a judicial officer can hardly, if ever be achieved.33 In disqualifying Justice
Robertson, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court did grant that the Justice is
certainly entitled to his opinion, and that this is one of his fundamental human rights.34
However, the ruling did not state that a judge may hold these opinions and at the same
time be a neutral and impartial arbiter of justice, as the Furundzija ruling and several
national legal systems suggest. To doubt a judge’s ability to detach his or her mind from
personal conviction or predispositions in the course of judicial duty is to weaken the idea
of judicial independence and professionalism. In all but the most extreme cases, the

32

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, supra at note 1, at para. 16. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
II at Tab 27].
33

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra at note 15, at para. 203 (citing President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others v. South African Rugby Football Union and Others). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 26].
34

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, supra at note 1, at para. 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 27].
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decision to resign from hearing a case must be the judge’s decision alone if judicial
independence is to be maintained.35
Finally, it would seem that the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court in Sesay
incorrectly characterized the “reasonable observer” in the second prong of the test cited
from Furundzija. The ruling in Furundzija made it clear that the observer is to be
presumed as having knowledge of all relevant circumstances, including the traditions of
integrity and impartiality that form a part of the background and apprised also of the fact
that impartiality is on of the duties that judges swear to uphold.36 The Appeals Chamber
of the Special Court in Sesay said that the crucial and decisive question was whether an
independent bystander, or reasonable man, reading the relevant passages in Justice
Robertson’s book will have a legitimate reason to fear that Justice Robertson lacks
impartiality.37 Without describing the knowledge of the reasonable man any further, the
SCSL Appeals Chamber comes to the conclusion that the reasonable man would
apprehend bias. However, to impart the reasonable man only with the knowledge of the
passages in Justice Robertson’s book is to clearly place him on unequal footing. To
properly apply the test devised in Furundzija, and to accurately detect an appearance of
bias, the SCSL Appeals Chamber would have to characterize the reasonable observer as
also having knowledge of the presumption of judicial impartiality.
In making its ruling, the SCSL Appeals Chamber in Sesay never suggested that
the ruling in Furundzija disposed of the matter. However, if Furundzija is to be
35

Id., at para. 11 (citing Justice Robertson’s statement in response to the motion by defense).

36

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, supra at note 15, at para. 190 (emphasis added). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook II at Tab 26].
37

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, supra at note 1, at para. 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook II at Tab 27].
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considered persuasive (and it would certainly seem so given that it was relied upon by the
defense and cited in great length by the SCSL Appeals Chamber in its opinion), then the
test for judicial impartiality must be properly applied. In misapplying the test with
respect to Justice Robertson, the SCSL Appeals Chamber has unjustifiably lowered the
threshold for disqualification of judges.
IV. NATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
When undertaking the task of formulating a universal standard or set of standards
for judicial independence and impartiality, it can be helpful to explore the standards for
judicial conduct of various nations. Although the following is not an exhaustive survey,
it is a representative one. The common theme of the importance of impartiality is
prominent; however, subtle differences between the several systems can be seen as well.
A. The United States
Beginning with the American judicial system, it is first important to note that the
United States Constitution unconditionally guarantees all criminal litigants the right to a
fair and impartial trial.38 Apart from the constitutional requirement, the judiciary
considers neutrality so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process that the judicial
code of ethics mandates impartiality.39 Canon 3 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
states generally that a judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and
diligently.40

38

The United States Constitution, at amendment VI (1791). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I
at Tab 15].

39

Mandamus and Recusal, supra at note 3, at 14 (citing Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(b)(5)
(1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 45].

40

Model Code of Judicial Conduct, at canon 3 (1990). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I at
Tab 17].
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The legislation dealing with disqualification of an American judge is found in
Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Most notably, Section 455(a) states
that a judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.41 This 1974 amendment to the statute is significant in that it is
a “catch-all” standard that asks what a reasonable person knowing all the relevant facts
would think about the impartiality of the judge.42 Section 455(a) is waivable by the
defense, but Section 455(b) provides non-waivable circumstances in which a judge shall
also be disqualified. The circumstances provided in this section are substantially similar
to that of other nations, and they include relatedness, personal bias toward a party,
financial interest and a potentially affected personal interest.43
It is important to note that while Section 455(a) was implemented as a more
objective standard for the evaluation of judicial bias and prejudice, recent jurisprudence
has limited its impact primarily to situations where the source of bias is extra-judicial, as
opposed to originating in the course of judicial proceedings.44 In other words, Section
455(a) applies more to an appearance of bias based on the judge’s past associations, and
Section 455(b) applies more to the judge’s associations and convictions concerning the
parties in any given case. At least one commentator believes this to be an incorrect
interpretation that sacrifices the appearance of judicial impartiality in the name of judicial
41
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economy.45 Historically however, the American judicial system has tended to favor the
side of the former rather than the latter. Although most American judges could probably
be fair in many questionable circumstances, the legal system has decided collectively that
even the appearance of partiality can undermine the justice system.46
The United States has quite frequently and publicly called into question the
impartiality of its federal judges. The most recent example of this is the public debate
that emerged over Supreme Court Justice Antonin Sclalia’s hunting trip with Vice
President Dick Cheney, in light of the fact that the Supreme Court was to review a case
involving the National Energy Policy Development Group, a committee chaired by
Cheney.47 The environmental organization known as Sierra Club filed a motion
requesting that Justice Scalia recuse himself from hearing the case, in light of his recent
hunting trip with the vice president, a named party in the case. In response, Justice Scalia
denied the motion in a scathing 21-page memorandum. Scalia was quick to point out that
he never spent any time alone with the vice president and not a word was spoken
regarding the case at issue.48 He went on to state that a judge’s “recusal is required if, by
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reason of [his] actions, his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”49 To support
his position, Scalia cited several examples of Supreme Court Justices who had often
fraternized with members of the executive and parties in cases before the Court, including
a skiing trip taken by Justice Byron White with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and a
weekend retreat attended by Justice Robert Jackson and President Franklin Roosevelt.50
Scalia’s principle point was that a no-friends rule requiring automatic recusal on the basis
of friendship would harm the justice system. He flatly denied the motion, adding “[i]f it
is reasonable to think that a Supreme Court Justice can be bought so cheap, the Nation is
in deeper trouble than I had imagined.”51
More notorious is the public stir over the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court by President Ronald Reagan in 1987. Bork was regarded by Reagan and
others as a premiere constitutional authority with outstanding intellect and unrivaled
scholarly credentials.52 It soon became clear through opposition, however, that Bork had
possibly been too public with his views on key issues. For example, Bork had been
highly critical of federal civil rights legislation in 1964, and also spoke against Supreme
Court decisions regarding the establishment of religion.53 Several individuals and
organizations opposed the nomination, but the most vehement opposition came from
Senator Ted Kennedy, who called Judge Bork the enemy of the individual in
49
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confrontations with the Government, and the enemy of Congress in confrontations with
the President.54 As a consequence of Judge Bork’s well-publicized ultra-conservative
leanings, the nomination was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 58-42.55 This should be
seen as distinguishable from the case of Justice Scalia’s denial of a motion for recusal in
two fundamental ways. First, the opposition to Judge Bork came in the context of a
Supreme Court nomination. In contrast, Justice Scalia already sat on the Court, and the
controversy involved his associations with a party in one particular case. Second, Bork’s
nomination failed due to his extreme conservative worldview, while Scalia’s denial of a
recusal motion involved the application of the statutory requirements for judicial
impartiality to a specific activity he engaged in. Taking these two important differences
into consideration, it becomes apparent that appointing a potentially inherently biased
judge to the highest court in the land may be significantly more harmful than the
repercussions of how the statutory provisions for impartiality are applied to an activity
engaged in by a sitting judge.
Several lower court decisions in the United States have addressed the issue of
judicial impartiality as well. For example, in United States v. Evans, defense counsel
moved for recusal on the grounds that he had opposed the trial judge’s nomination one
year before the case was heard based on political attitudes and academic writings, and
that this was a source of judicial bias against the defense counsel.56 The District Court
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for the Central Division of Utah denied the recusal motion, stating that defense counsel
raises only an allegation of prior interaction and partiality pursuant to Section 455(a)
against him, not his client, and that this is insufficient to require recusal.57 Furthermore,
the motion to recuse referred to academic writings by the trial judge published 5 years
before the case at hand.58 In response, the court held that at some point, even a genuine
appearance of impartiality will begin to fade away, and that defense counsel’s allegations
are disappearing into the past.59
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a
recusal motion that was grounded in the fact that the trial judge owned stock in an
insurance company that was among the victims of the defendant’s fraud offense.60
Recognizing that, at least in some circumstances, a judge should recuse if the judge or the
judge’s spouse owns stock in a crime victim, the court declined to adopt a per se rule
requiring recusal in every instance where a judge has an interest in a victim of a crime.61
Rather, the court held that recusal is required only where the extent of the judge's interest
in the crime victim is so substantial, or the amount that the victim might recover as
restitution is so substantial, that an objective observer would have a reasonable basis to
doubt a judge’s impartiality.62
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Also, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a
plaintiff’s motion for recusal that was based on the grounds of friendship with the
defendant.63 The court held that the mere fact that a judge knows or knows of an
attorney, witness or litigant is insufficient to warrant recual.64 Similarly, the mere fact
that a judge is a member of a bar association and socializes at such functions with
attorneys or judges who may at some point in time appear before him is also insufficient
to warrant recusal.65
B. A Brief Survey of Other Nations
1. The United Kingdom
In the case of the United Kingdom, an important difference from other systems is
apparent in that the courts look for a real danger of bias, rather than a likelihood.66 In
other words, it is unnecessary that the court look through the eyes of a reasonable man,
because the court first has to ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available
evidence, knowledge of which would not necessarily be available to an observer in court
at the relevant time.67
In the United Kingdom, the general rule considered part of the common law and
regarded as a rule of natural justice is that a judge should disqualify himself if he has any
pecuniary interest in the matter, however small, and however unlikely it is to affect his
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judgment.68 A judge should also disqualify himself in there are any circumstances of
whatever nature which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion by one party that the
judge might be biased.69
An example of a case in the United Kingdom in which a judge’s impartiality was
at issue is In Re Pinochet. The decision was issued by the House of Lords on January 15,
1999. The case arose as a petition to set aside an earlier decision by the Appellate
Committee concerning a judgment rendered against Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet was the
head of state in Chile from 1973 to 1990. During this time, various crimes against
humanity including torture, hostage taking and murder took place.70 Specifically,
Pinochet’s defense raised the issue that Lord Hoffman, one of the judges who heard the
original appeal, was so closely connected with the human rights group Amnesty
International as to create an appearance of bias against Pinochet.71 Pinochet did not
allege that Lord Hoffman was actually biased, but rather that there was a real danger or
reasonable apprehension or suspicion that he may have been biased.72 The House of
Lords set aside the earlier judgment and ordered a re-hearing. The opinion stated that a
man may not be a judge in his own cause, and that the mere fact of Amnesty
International’s interest (the trial and possible conviction of Pinochet) is sufficient to
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disqualify Lord Hoffman.73 This decision to disqualify speaks to the importance of the
“danger of bias” test applied by courts in the United Kingdom.
2. Australia
In Australia, much like in Great Britain, the common law and generally perceived
obligations of judicial independence restrain judges from taking part in cases in which
they may have an interest.74 Attitudes differ on the issue of writing books, but the
general consensus is that judges ought not write or publish books of a legal nature once
they are appointed.75
The High Court of Australia has held that when testing for bias, a court must
consider whether the circumstances would give a fair-minded and informed observer a
“reasonable apprehension of bias.”76 This is where the Australian system differs from the
British system, namely in the inclusion of a reasonable observer standard in its test for
impartiality. It is also important to note that the knowledge of the observer in this test
encompasses all circumstances, including the presumption of impartiality, much like the
test in Furundzija.
3. Belgium

73

Id.

74

Hon. Mr. Justice M.D. Kirby, “Australia”, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra at note 68, at 22.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 38].
75

Id. at 23.

76

Webb v. The Queen, supra at note 20, at 45. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at Tab 34].

20

The Judicial Code provides numerous grounds for recusal by Belgian judges.77 A
judge will voluntarily withdraw if he is informed that such a ground exists, and may also
disqualify himself on personal grounds.
The Belgian rules for extra-judicial practice are rather strict as compared to many
others. A judge may not be involved in legal practice or paid arbitration.78 Likewise,
judges cannot be involved in public or business activities.79 In spite of all of these
regulations, judges are still not restricted from writing books.
4. France
The Code of Judicial Organization and the Code of Civil Procedure provide the
rules of self-disqualification for French judges. The main tests are family ties between
the judge and one of the parties, either directly or by marriage.80 Business relations with
a party may also be cause for disqualification.81 In addition, well-known antagonism or
friendship between a judge and a party may be sufficient.82
The rules prohibiting extra-judicial activity are strict, but judges are still permitted
to write books, provided they remain subject to the limitation of obligation de reserve.83
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5. Germany
Section 22 of the German Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozeβordnung)
provides the basic grounds for the disqualification of a judge in a criminal case. The
main test is kinship to the accused or aggrieved party.84 Section 23 of the same code
provides that a judge shall be disqualified from hearing a case on appeal when he has
participated in the same case in a lower instance.85 Germany also serves as one of the
archetypal examples of a system that places emphasis on the appearance of bias. Section
24 provides that a judge’s impartiality may be challenged for fear of bias and that such a
challenge is proper if there is reason to distrust the impartiality of a judge.86Therefore, a
German judge’s impartiality can be challenged based on an objective apprehension of
bias without alleging actual bias, similar to the challenge in Furundzija.
6. Japan
The rules for judicial exclusion and challenge in Japan are provided by the Codes
of Civil and Criminal Procedure. A Japanese judge’s self-disqualification is automatic in
a criminal case if the judge is the victim, is a relative or guardian of the accused or the
victim, is a witness, becomes an attorney for the case, previously prosecuted the case, or
participated in the previous instance of the same case.87 The provisions for challenging a
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judge are intended to supplement the provisions that automatically exclude a judge.88
The Criminal Code provides that a judge may be challenged if there is an apprehension
that he will render a partial verdict.89 In this respect, Japan is similar to the other nations
that require only an apprehension of bias rather than actual bias.
The Code of Civil Procedure provides a similar standard for exclusion, forbidding
the judge to preside if he or his spouse is a party, or if there is a degree of relatedness
between the judge and one of the parties.90 However, the provision for challenging a
judge’s impartiality makes no mention of an apprehension of bias, but merely provides
for a challenge if there are such circumstances that may prejudice partiality.91
The standards relating to extra-judicial activities are very strict in Japan, but
judges can and do frequently write academic books and articles.92
C. Conclusions
This brief survey of the standards for judicial independence and impartiality in
various nations is a useful consideration in the task of devising a universal standard. The
idea of a fair trial, as it pertains to the tribunal, should not differ substantially from
traditional notions of a fair, impartial trial in the domestic sense. Therefore, a survey of
these national standards should be at least partially indicative of what the international
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legal community believes to be the rules that outline acceptable and unacceptable conduct
for judges.
In general, most national legal systems agree that a judge has a duty to withdraw
from a case where a close personal relationship with one of the parties exists, or a
personal interest is at stake. Where the personal interest provision is not mentioned, as in
the case of Japan, it is assumed to be encompassed by the general “catch-all” challenge
provisions. Differences appear regarding whether the apprehension of bias by the
hypothetical well-informed observer is sufficient to require disqualification. Also, in all
of the standards of conduct that mention the subject, the writing and publishing of
academic books by judges seems to be viewed as not affecting their impartiality.
It should be stressed at this juncture that these national standards of conduct apply
to judges once they are sworn in. It is impossible for a standard of judicial conduct to
apply retroactively. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that proscribed conduct for a
judge has no bearing on that person’s involvements before he or she became a judge. In
other words, if it is generally accepted that the publishing of an academic book or
treatises by a judge does not affect that judge’s neutrality, then it stands to reason that any
such publication before taking the judicial oath has even less effect.
V. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
Relatively little has been written on the subject of the independence of the
international judiciary.93 However, the judicial impartiality standards of international
legal bodies can also be helpful in devising a universal test for neutrality. These
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standards can be found in the rules of procedure for the hybrid court in Sierra Leone and
the International Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, as well as the International Court
of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights.
Additionally, much work has been done by independent organizations, like the
International Law Association’s Project on International Courts and Tribunals, on the
subject of impartiality in the international judiciary. All of these sources can be helpful
in discerning exactly how the international legal community views the issues involved
with impartiality, especially when examined together with the domestic standards
outlined above.
A. The ad hoc Tribunals
The primary focus of attention regarding the independence of international
tribunals has been on the methods of selecting judges and their qualifications.94 The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda agreed to adopt the Rules of Procedure for
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.95 Subsequently, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone agreed to adopt the Rules of Procedure for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.96 Therefore, all three of the tribunals are
governed by the same set of rules with minor variations. The pertinent provision is found
in Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure. A tribunal judge may not sit in any case in which
94
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he or she has a personal interest or concerning which the judge has or has had any
association which might affect his or her impartiality.97 As both Sesay and Furundzija
demonstrate, any party may raise the issue of disqualification of a tribunal judge.98 The
phrase “any association which might affect his or her impartiality,” is rather broad, and
could be subject to interpretation when applied to activities of judges before being elected
to the tribunal. However, based on the test adopted in Furundzija, it can at least be
assumed that Rule 15 encompasses bias that would be ascertained by the “reasonable
observer.”
B. The International Court of Justice
The Statute of the International Court of Justice contains several provisions that
speak to the independence and impartiality of its judges. First, Article 16 provides that
no member of the court may exercise any political or administrative function, or engage
in any other occupation of a professional nature.99 Also, no member of the court may act
as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case, or may participate in the decision of any case
in which he or she has previously acted as any of these things.100 These restrictions on
judicial activity are of the most basic in nature, and some equivalency in one form or
another can usually be found in the statutes of other international judiciary bodies.101 A
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judge can only be dismissed for failing to abide by the above restrictions by a unanimous
opinion of the other members of the court.102 The rule enforcing this provision is found
in Article 6 of the Rules of Procedure for the court.103
One unique feature of the International Court of Justice arises in the context of the
nationality of judges. If a judge is a national of a state that is a party to a case before the
court, rather than requiring that judge to recuse, an ad hoc judge from the other state party
will be appointed to balance the scales.104
Above all, every member of the International Court of Justice is required to make
a solemn declaration in open court that his or her powers will be exercised impartially
and conscientiously.105 This once again speaks to the importance and consideration
courts rightly attribute to the judicial oath of impartiality.106 This provision is enforced
further by the Rules of Procedure for the court.107
C. The International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is rather brief in its
treatment of judicial impartiality, relative to its entire length. The relevant articles
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provide that judges shall not engage in any activity that is likely to interfere with their
judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence.108
Regarding challenge and disqualification, a judge on the International Criminal
Court shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably
be doubted on any ground, or if the judge was involved with the case at the national
level.109 Additionally, any decision regarding a challenge to independence or impartiality
must be made by an absolute majority of judges.110
Based on the language of the above provisions, it appears as though the
International Criminal Court will operate on the “reasonable observer” standard discussed
above. Although no mention is made of a reasonable or well-informed observer in the
statute of the court, the language, “affect confidence in” and “might reasonably doubted”
would suggest that an outsider’s apprehension of bias is the true arbiter of impartiality for
the court.
D. The European Court of Human Rights
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.111 Pursuant to this provision, the European Court
of Human Rights has formulated a two prong test that has a subjective part dealing with a
judge’s personal convictions, and an objective part determining whether there are
108
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sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in the judge’s impartiality.112 The
court has stressed, in regards to the subjective part of the test, that the impartiality of a
judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary.113 However, in interpreting
the objective part of the test, the court has held that it is required that a tribunal is not
only genuinely impartial, but also that it appears to be impartial.114 What is decisive,
according to the court, is whether the fear that a particular judge lacks impartiality can be
held objectively justified.115
E. The Work of the Project on International Courts and Tribunals
In examining international standards of judicial independence, it is also helpful to
consider the guidelines and sets of standards proposed by the International Law
Association’s Project on International Courts and Tribunals. The Project on International
Courts and Tribunals is an internationally based effort to facilitate the work of
international courts and tribunals through academic research and concrete action.116 The
Project realized in 2001 that the International Law Association could play an important
role in identifying principles and developing guidelines which might enhance the
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operation of existing tribunals and provide useful models for future bodies.117 The result
was the formation of the Study Group on the Practice and Procedure of International
Courts and Tribunals, and the subsequent Burgh House Principles on the Independence of
the International Judiciary, which reflect the discussions of the Study Group at its five
meetings to date.118
Of particular importance in the International Law Association Burgh House
Principles is the principle regarding extra-judicial activity, which states that judges
should not engage in any extra-judicial activity that is incompatible with their judicial
function or that may affect their independence or impartiality.119 Equally important are
the principles dealing with a judge’s past links. First, judges shall not serve in a case in
which they have previously served in any capacity or a case with the subject matter of
which they have had any other form of association, not including prior academic
publications, that may affect or may reasonably be considered to affect their
independence or impartiality.120 Second, judges shall not sit in a case involving a party
for whom they have served in any capacity, or with whom they have had any other
significant professional or personal link within the previous three years or such other
period as the court may establish within its rules.121 Finally, a judge shall not sit in any
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case in the outcome of which they hold any material personal, professional or financial
interest.122
VI. ANALYSIS BASED ON THE FOREGOING
In light of all of the above observations, it is possible to infer some basic universal
standard that address which practices by international judges will or will not be seen to
affect their impartiality. After all, there is some commonality in the requirements to be
an international judge in the first place.123
To begin with, the test for judicial impartiality and disqualification formulated in
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija is likely to serve as some kind of template for all of the
others. Not only was it the first appellate decision in the ICTY to address if and when a
judge can be disqualified for bias, it also provides a clear test for doing so where the
Statutes and Rules of the tribunals are silent on the matter.124 It is extremely detailed, yet
uncomplicated, and it emphasizes both the importance of the appearance of impartiality
and the knowledge of the “reasonable observer”. It also raises the bar fairly high and
makes it unlikely that a judge in the ICTY will voluntarily disqualify him or herself in
any but the most obvious circumstances.125
It is important to comprehend the circumstances surrounding the decision of the
Appeals Chamber in Furundzija. Judge Mumba had indisputably spoken out, in an
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official capacity, against offenses by certain people in the former Yugoslavia who were
now defendants before the court.126 The only argument that can be made to diminish the
possible effect this previous involvement could have on Judge Mumba’s impartiality
would be to assert that she was acting as a representative working in the best interest of
the Government of Zambia. Otherwise, one must conclude that if the presumption of
impartiality is strong enough to overcome convictions expressed while serving on the
United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, then it must be strong enough to
counter personal convictions expressed in an academic setting before even taking an oath
to uphold impartiality.
It is true that the test in Furundzija is more concerned with the appearance of bias
than with actual bias.127 However, if the apprehension of bias must come from a wellinformed observer, as the test calls for, then it is important to recognize that this observer
would not only know that a judge expressed his opinions in an academic writing before
becoming a judge, but also that there is an oath taken by judges and that there is a high
threshold to reach in order to rebut the presumption of impartiality.128
Applying the Furundzija test as a starting point, it is now possible to add the slant
provided by the various national standards for impartiality. The United States looks at
the issues of judicial impartiality and disqualification with a discerning eye, as evidenced
by the case of Justice Scalia and the nomination debate surrounding Judge Bork. It
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certainly seems possible that, especially in light of the failed Bork nomination, that a
judge’s academic past could have a detrimental affect on the appearance of impartiality.
After all, it was precisely Bork’s academic credentials and expertise that caused the
rejection of his nomination.129 However, Senate confirmation hearings are a very
different situation from a criminal trial. In the case of a nominated Supreme Court
Justice, the nominee is not yet on the bench. Therefore, there is not yet a presumption of
impartiality in place to rebut any doubts regarding bias. This is only to suggest that it is
possible that the academic history of a judge is not viewed in the United States the same
in the context of Supreme Court nominations as it is in the context of a trial judge’s
impartiality.
As for the standards of other national judicial systems, some variations can be
seen, especially in the inclusion or exclusion of a “reasonable observer” test. The various
national systems are in general agreement on the principle that judges should not write
books on legal subjects while on the bench. Also, all of the surveyed national standards
are silent as to what types of academic activities before taking the oath will be seen as
adversely affecting impartiality.
It is also unanimous that a judge has a duty to withdraw from a case in which he
or she has a personal interest. In this respect, it remains unanswered whether books
written before being sworn in will be indicative of such an interest. It would seem that
such academic writings would not be dispositive of the personal interest issue, but could
feasibly be used to support a showing of an interest. Again, it is important to view this
issue through the lens of the presumption of impartiality once sworn in.
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In the international judicial arena, the rules of procedure for the ad hoc tribunals
provide minimal insight into formulating a clear standard for impartiality. One possible
reason for this could be the assumption that the process of selection of judges for the
tribunals will take care of the problems of conflict of interest since the selectors will be
acquainted with the issues to be decided and the candidates’ qualifications.130 For
example, in the selection process of judges for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, the Russian Judge Valentin G. Kisilez was defeated to avoid any
appearance of a pro-Serb bias.131 Nevertheless, the general personal interest restrictions
clearly apply.132 Apart from this, the restriction on sitting in a case that may affect
impartiality is broad and open to interpretation regarding activities engaged in before
being elected to the tribunal. However, tests like the one in Furundzija help to clarify the
standard.
The standards of other international judicial bodies are slightly clearer. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice, for example, goes to great pains to elaborate
what is expected of judges.133 Also, the language of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court used in the restriction on sitting in cases where impartiality might be
doubted is indicative of an “apprehension of bias” test, much like the one in
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Furundzija.134 Likewise, the two-part test of the European Court of Human Rights
emphasizes the importance of the appearance of bias to an observer, as well as the
presumption of impartiality.135 This means that any challenge based on activities by a
judge before sitting on the bench can be evaluated by these international judicial bodies
using standards similar to those in Furundzija.
Finally, the International Law Association Burgh House Principles on the
Independence of the International Judiciary provide gloss to the above standards. Under
the International Law Association Principles, the fact that a judge may not engage in
activity that could affect his or her impartiality applies only to activities engaged in while
sitting on the bench. Regarding the provisions dealing with past links, it is unlikely that
opinions expressed in a book before being sworn in would be found to amount to the type
of former association with a party referred to in the principles. In this same respect, and
unique to the International Law Association Principles, a set period of time (three years)
is proposed, which could quite possibly eliminate a great deal of a judge’s academic
writings before he or she sat on the bench.136

VII. CONCLUSION
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Given the qualifications one must have to be chosen or elected as an international
judge, absolute neutrality assumes the character of a legal fiction. This is implicit in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 36 provides the required
qualifications for potential judges, and mandates that every candidate shall have
established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant
experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity in
criminal proceedings.137 Certainly, with such experience come personal convictions.
Political sympathies do not in themselves imply a lack of impartiality towards the parties
before the court.138 This examination of numerous standards for judicial impartiality and
independence demonstrates that it is far to presumptuous to boldly declare that because a
person, prior to becoming a judge, has written critically about war crimes attributed to a
defendant now before his court, he is unable to render a fair and impartial judgment based
on the facts adduced at trial. Assuming that the test elaborated in Furundzija is the
proper test, and is the cumulative representative of several national and international
standards, many other factors must be considered in making a finding of bias. Keeping in
mind that the appearance of impartiality and independence is of the utmost importance to
public confidence in the judiciary, great deference must nevertheless be given to the overarching presumption of the inherent impartiality of the judicial office, as well as the
assumption that a judge is able to detach his or her personal convictions and
predispositions from the judicial duties. Finally, as stressed in Furundzija, it is of the
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utmost importance if whatever the judge has done to cast doubt upon his or her
impartiality was done or engaged in before the judge sat on the bench.
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